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This paper presents a conceptual framework for both assessing the role of economic
instruments, and reshaping them in order to enhance their contribution to the goals of
managing water scarcity. Water management problems stem from the mismatch between a
multitude of individual decisions, on the one hand, and the current and projected status of
water resources on the other. Economics can provide valuable incentives that drive indi-
vidual decisions, and can design efficient instruments to address water governance pro-
blems in a context of conflicting interests and relevant transaction costs. Yet, instruments
such as water pricing or trading are mostly based on general principles of welfare eco-
nomics that are not readily applicable to assets as complex as water. A flaw in welfare
economic approaches lies in the presumption that economic instruments may be good or
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bad on their own (e.g., finding the “right” price). This vision changes radically when we
focus on the problem, instead of the instrument. In this paper, we examine how economic
instruments to achieve welfare-enhancing water resource outcomes can realize their full
potential in basin-scale management contexts. We follow a political economy perspective
that views conflicts between public and private interest as the main instrumental challenge
of water management. Our analysis allows us to better understand the critical importance of
economic instruments for reconciling individual actions towards collective ambitions of
water efficiency, equity and sustainability with lessons for later-adopting jurisdictions.
Rather than providing panaceas, the successful design and implementation of economic
instruments as key river basin management arrangements involves high transaction costs,
wide institutional changes and collective action at different levels.
Keywords: Economic instruments; river basin management; political economy;
water policy.
1. Introduction
A global imbalance between the supply of and demand for water resources is being
increasingly realized under population growth pressures, changing distributions of
wealth and consumption, and adverse climatic events (OECD 2015). This has
resulted in future water crises being consistently identified as the single greatest
global social threat in terms of impact (WEF 2017). Addressing this threat will
require water managers to rebalance water resource use across groups including
urban towns and cities, industrial and mining businesses, agricultural farms and
ecosystems. Inequitable utilization of water resources can harm downstream
groups in a river basin via diminished and unreliable water supplies and decreased
water quality (Quiggin 2001). Rebalancing water-use between groups is compli-
cated by fundamental welfare questions raised by Hicks (1939), Kaldor (1939) and
Pigou (1932) on how to reallocate resources such that we minimize harm and
maximize the benefits from their changed use.
Water reallocation is thus a complex issue. Political institutions, the framework
of laws and customs in which they operate, and the distribution of political power
in economic policy making also shape the transaction costs of reallocation and the
range of policies that can be implemented. Diverse methods have been applied to
this issue over the last 150 years. Before concerns about the limited nature of water
resources became commonplace, water management priorities focused on mobi-
lizing and/or adapting supply to relevant uses and places through engineering
projects (Dinar and Saleth 2005). Water engineering has played a progressive and
integral part of many countries’ economic development (Grey and Sadoff 2007;
Hall et al. 2014), with economic benefits often used to secure the significant
funding associated with the supply-based projects. Matching supply and demand in
a growing economy has thus made investment in water an important driver of
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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economic development. Benefits are taken for granted, subsidies may be viewed as
beneficial for competitiveness and growth and, besides covering financial needs,
cheap water is considered desirable on equity and progressive grounds.
However, water demand often grows (significantly) above the combined supply
capacity of natural and man-made capital. Institutional dynamics and information
constraints, coupled with uncertain water supply as a result of climate change and
growing environmental concerns, may lead to short-term solutions involving water
over-allocation (Vörösmarty et al. 2010). Eventually, low-social-cost options for
impounding water will be exhausted (Randall 1981), and institutional tipping-
points increasingly exposed by droughts and other climate extremes. This will
exacerbate structural problems and social conflicts, and policy priorities will shift
away from promoting simultaneous development in different areas of the economy.
Instead, policy focus will turn to making use of water in a sector/place compatible
with: (i) the resources available in the short-term; and (ii) those resources likely to
be available in the longer-term — a process that is known as river basin closure
(Falkenmark and Molden 2008). Recognition of the complex interaction between,
and interdependence across, multiple water-user groups has in turn prompted the
adoption of integrated water resource management arrangements in many devel-
oped contexts. Integrated management arrangements often highlight the need for
wider planning and data collection in many areas to support and deliver water
(re)allocation to meet collective (common-good) objectives. In recent decades, it
has been argued that the best way to achieve these collective objectives is through
economic instruments such as water pricing/charges, cooperative agreements and
market-based transfers (Lago et al. 2015). Water management economic instru-
ments thus go beyond incentives to penalize/reward individual behavior: the dis-
tinctive characteristics of the resource call for cooperation between local, regional
and national groups of interest, including public institutions. Consequently, while
methods for managing water can be thought of as having become increasingly
focused over time, the scale of water resource management has grown exponen-
tially away from simple supply-oriented operations to basin-wide dimensions
involving multiple jurisdictions, users and complex management arrangements.
Ideally, economic instruments in water are designed to facilitate the establish-
ment, or overcome barriers to the formation, of functioning trades. Properly
implemented, economic instruments can serve to coordinate water decisions and
align them with social interests or goals (e.g., reallocation of water to the envi-
ronment). However, this requires purposely designed instruments that harmonize
individual decision outcomes with complete water policy objectives (Lago et al.
2015). Traditional harmonization approaches have typically provided inadequate
signals for changing people’s decisions so that they contribute to collective
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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objectives such as efficiency, equity and sustainability at a river basin scale.
Social problems have arisen, where the initial allocation of rights is biased towards
the polluter (Coase 1960), inertia prevents groups from acting in the common good
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975) or where groups including the environment
(Quiggin 2001), impoverished sections of society or future generations (Bromley
2007) and/or indigenous peoples (Nikolakis et al. 2013) are excluded from market
participation. Political barriers may also arise where: supply scheduling, capacity
or natural scarcity transition rapidly between elastic and inelastic states (Randall
1981); policy-phasing fails to understand the hydrological realities including in-
complete knowledge of future water supply and variability (Loch et al. 2014); adopted
instruments send different signals in their implementation or co-implementation
(Lago et al. 2015); there is a lack of clear policy objectives and political buy-in at all
levels (Castle 1978); prior policy investments (lock-in costs) determine the current
public and private investment options in river basin management (Garrick et al.
2013); and/or there is a lack of institutional support, funding or enforcement of rules
(Garrick and Aylward 2012). As a result, in cases, where economic instruments have
been implemented, society may still be worse off if the costs (including the transaction
costs) of implementing these reforms and any residual welfare losses exceed the
revenue (if any) obtained from adopting economic instruments.
In this paper, we examine how economic instruments to achieve welfare-en-
hancing water resource outcomes can realize their full potential in basin-scale
management contexts. After developing a basic framework in the next section, we
use it to review the literature on water markets, charges, efficiency subsidies and
voluntary agreements. We suggest that the adoption of economic instruments can
only be the outcome of social decision processes resulting from the influence of
interest groups. Without clear rules and regulations underpinning interaction within
a river basin, the negative externalities (e.g., low allocations to the environment)
associated with the actions of one group (i.e., those overusing a resource) will not
be addressed (Laffont and Tirole 1991). Managing water at the basin scale
therefore implies assigning economic instruments to a distinctive role within the
relevant policy framework, such that they achieve the greatest collective good
consistent with the fundamental social- and political-welfare questions discussed
above.
2. Water Realpolitik: Settling for Second-Best Options
2.1. Public transaction costs as a basis for economic instruments
The implementation of relevant political and institutional reforms necessary to
underpin the process of basin closure is challenging. Arguments for closure will
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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inevitably need to be based on objective scientific facts, and institutions may need
to be updated or created to deal with water (re)allocation. Arrangements for
identifying, quantifying and legitimizing collective objectives for water resource
use will be necessary. Planning in support of administering those objectives will
also be needed, as will the means to enforce decisions taken through penalizing
individuals who do not comply. This is the role of public transaction costs.
Public transaction costs in water (re)allocation include: (i) institutional transi-
tion costs to describe, design and implement new arrangements aimed at reorga-
nization, that correspond to an investment phase; and (ii) static transaction costs to
administer, monitor and enforce those existing or new arrangements, that corre-
spond to a consolidation phase; where (iii) our choices in both cases are con-
strained by prior institutional or technological lock-in costs (Marshall 2013;
McCann et al. 2005). Engineering approaches may arguably comprise higher
production (e.g., capital, operation and maintenance, abatement etc.) rather than
transaction costs. But an increasing reliance on economic instruments requires
significant transaction costs associated with policy, program and project devel-
opment or management (Samnakay 2016). Research suggests that, within new
water policy in particular, transaction costs represent a major share of the total
required investment (Marshall 2013; McCann et al. 2005).
River basin policy often assumes a capacity by individuals and governments to
reorganize in order to conserve, preserve and restore ecosystem health (Woolley
and McGinnis 1999). Factors such as incomplete information, political entangle-
ment, naïve faith in science and effects of multilevel government all impact on
individual or governmental attempts to reorganize successfully (Loch et al. 2014),
and can prevent desirable outcomes (Vörösmarty et al. 2010). Yet, the ultimate
objective for river basin managers should be to achieve a set of institutional and/or
(re)organizational arrangements that: minimize the sum of impacts on transaction
costs (Challen 2000); minimize the costs of failing to meet targets (Eggers 2006);
monetize and differentiate institutional options for cost–benefit assessments
(Krutilla and Krause 2011); or identify the transaction cost-lowering option over
time (Marshall 2013).1 Whilst easy to specify, these objective functions are difficult
(and costly) to achieve. An expanded welfare question following that proposed by
1The role of the economist as an assessor of policy using cost-benefit analysis to identify an opti-
mised solution is called into question by Bromley (1990), who asserts that politicians are the best
arbiters of policy selection, and that only after a selection has been made should economists become
involved in the assessment of that policy as an instrument for achieving objectives specified by the
collective. This reduces the typical focus on efficiency in favour of effectiveness, where the evalu-
ative criterion becomes one of matching policy decisions and institutional contributions to meeting
societies’ collective objectives.
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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Hicks, Kaldor and Pigou above therefore is: how do we best facilitate river
basin governance arrangements to keep transaction costs manageable, reduce
the risk of future legal challenges, and ensure democratic legitimacy (Huitema
et al. 2009)?
Ultimately there appears to be no prescribed set of arrangements that river basin
managers can rely on to help them devise lower polycentric arrangements and
transaction costs. McCann (2013) asserts that environmental policy design itself
should be considered an instrument to reduce transaction costs, and adds a re-
quirement of political acceptability to the list of evaluation criteria; albeit with a
focus on static transaction over institutional transition costs. Such views assume a
degree of urgency under an increasing recognition that current river basin systems
will be challenging to maintain in the face of future climate change-driven vari-
ability, which has the capacity to dislocate established distributions of costs and
benefits and will likely favor the most politically-important players (Moan and
Smith 2007). It is into this context that economic instruments have thus assumed a
greater role for global water (re)allocation objectives. However, Marston and Cai
(2016) correctly observe that water reallocation is challenging because of a general
global lack of suitable and effective institutional capacity. They suggest requisite
investments needed to support complex reallocation mechanisms, such as markets
or water pricing, may render them inaccessible to many contexts — driving the
need for research into non-market reallocation institutional support mechanisms
in the future. Thus, there is a requirement to examine economic instruments in
more detail.
2.2. The role of economic instruments
Where institutional capacity is sufficient, economic instruments may begin to
flourish in response to policy requirements. But to date, other than as a means to
raise revenue, economic instruments have performed largely a secondary role in
water (re)allocation. Prescriptions for full-cost water pricing and tradable water
rights, while not uncommon in the literature, are still far from achieving the actual
objectives of most water management policies (UN 2016). Hahn’s (1989) classic
paper suggests that economics and economists may be partially to blame by the
way policy-makers follow their advice: “one of the problems with ivory tower
theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to
be solved, and the range of potential solutions” (Hahn 1989: p. 95). Most of the
basic normative prescriptions on water pricing and markets are rooted in the first
fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which states that competitive markets
are an effective means to take advantage of existing welfare improvement
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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opportunities among individuals, and that prices can lead to an efficient (re)allo-
cation of resources (Feldman 2008). This implies that allocative-efficiency of water
resources requires full-cost-recovery pricing of water including operation, main-
tenance, capital costs, all other opportunity costs and externalities (Rogers et al.
2002, 1998). Efficient prices will ideally arise as a by-product of well-functioning
markets. According to Mendelsohn (2016: p. 1) “the price of water becomes its
marginal value. With a market, the marginal value becomes the same for all users
and available water is efficiently allocated.2 As demand and supply conditions
change, the market adjusts the price and the system remains efficient”.
However, more often than not, temporal volatility of water supply creates
non-convexity in market prices, while scarcity also creates irreversible con-
sequences for those who cannot afford to meet (high) market prices. Moreover,
practical application of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics to
water may transform common pool resources that necessitate coordination (e.g.,
groundwater) into private goods managed through competition — in turn creating
negative impacts (e.g., aquifer overdraft). As the second theorem of welfare eco-
nomics makes clear, allocative efficiency is not at odds with other socially-relevant
criteria. Just the contrary: well-functioning markets guarantee that advances in
fairness and policy acceptability are not fulfilled at the expense of economic
efficiency. Thus, primary economic claims that prices and markets are appropriate
for water (re)allocation may actually be based on incorrect foundations, rather than
being constrained by conspicuous obstacles of shifting from abstract recommen-
dations to empirical applications.
Contrary to a significant body of literature (see e.g., Briscoe 1996; Mendelsohn
2016), enacting competitive water prices and effective water markets is more
complex than overcoming implementation problems. The advantages of efficient
water pricing and trade are based on the logic and principles of market failure
(Coase 1960; Demsetz 1967), where public interventions transform externalities
and collective concerns into private decisions, and competition efficiently
(re)allocates resources. The logic of market failure implicitly assumes that water-use
decisions can be decentralized, and that public authorities need only properly
define and protect/enforce property rights. Water resources have distinctive char-
acteristics (e.g., public, private and common pool goods; economies of scale and
indivisibilities; externalities) that call for dialog between interest groups, in which
governance and institutions play a decisive role. Water’s distinctive characteristics
therefore mean that, when identifying solutions to water challenges, we may first
2That is, a unique price is set in the market that equals the marginal value of water at its intersection
with the supply curve.
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look to effective forms of institutions and collective action rather than to
moderating individuals’ decisions and competition. In other words, water problems
such as scarcity, quality degradation, exposure to water-related risk etc. can more
readily be interpreted as the outcome of governance, rather than market failure.
Two lines of reasoning are important in this regard: the first one focuses on the
nature of water as a distinctive economic good (Hanemann 2006), and the second
focuses on the distinctive nature of water management (Ostrom 2010 2007); but
both cite the requirement for coordinated (and largely polycentric) governance over
competition-focused responses at a river basin scale. The first line of reasoning
highlights the very nature of water as an economic good, and requirements for
comprehensive management at a river basin scale (Hanemann 2006). Water
resources provide an intertwined array of private, public and common pool goods
with varied characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability. Combined with
the ‘mobility’ of water and the possibility of sequential uses along the hydrological
cycle, it becomes difficult for markets and governments to keep track of the myriad
positive and negative welfare effects of any alternative use. Water is also distinctive
as a heterogeneous commodity that varies relevant to human welfare issues such as
time, location, quality and security of supply — making it difficult for prices to
reflect these differences in the value of water across time and space. Water is also
bulky, costly to store and transport and thus to (re)allocate. As discussed, most
historic investments in water development are capital-intensive, with scale econ-
omies that can only be harnessed by integrating supply-services and coordinating
stakeholders and governments. Water is also essential for life and for maintaining
the freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems that economies and people rely
upon. Thus, water decisions imply complex trade-offs. Though not excluding a
certain role for prices and trading, these distinctive characteristics necessitate
institutions and coordination. Competition and markets are welcome; not as an
end, but as an instrument for better coordination and governance.
The second complementary line of reasoning envisages the challenge of water
management in designing and implementing non-coercive instruments to trigger
collective action (Ostrom 2008, 1990). Under this perspective, water-policy con-
cerns are fundamentally explained as governance, rather than market, failures.
Failure comes from not identifying options to reconcile individual water-use
decisions with what is in society’s best interests — particularly objectives that
preserve the resource base and maintain long-term positive welfare and water
ecosystem outcomes. Economic instruments can offer non-coercive means to
achieve collective objectives; but under this approach, market and pricing schemes
should not be assessed on their properties, nor whether they reflect opportunity
costs in full or allow for near to perfect competition. Rather, economic instruments
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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should be assessed on their capacity to effectively contribute to collective objec-
tives such as managing water scarcity, halting the degradation of water quality,
reducing user exposure to droughts and increasing water security in the long-term.3
But, we caution that implementing economic instruments as panaceas to cope with
complex environmental challenges is unlikely to work. Experience over the last
50 years illustrates the radical failure of promoting isolated water panaceas;
whether via strong bureaucracies, water-users’ associations or tradable water
rights. According to empirical tests conducted by Meinzen-Dick (2007), none of
these approaches live up to expectations, and water institutions require continuous
improvement in order to adapt their performance to the particular needs of water
policy. How then do we ensure effective economic instruments in the management
of river basin water resources? In the next two sections, we outline the basis for
economic instruments in water (re)allocation, and how they may be applied to
overcome governance failure.
3. Economic Instruments: Welfare-Enhancing Opportunities
to Address Water Governance Failures
Assuming institutional capacity and positive transaction costs, economic incentives
for water management are feasible if two basic conditions are met: appropriate
rationales for participation, and incentive compatibility (see e.g., Fudenberg and
Tirole 1991). The first condition dictates instruments that encourage individuals to
engage in a specific action on the premise of subsequent private benefit. The
second condition dictates that those individual actions are aligned or made com-
patible with collective public objectives. Hence, opportunities to use economic
instruments exist in situations where: (i) there are welfare-improving opportunities
that can be transformed into private benefits for water-users (e.g., economic sur-
pluses from transferring water to more productive uses); and (ii) collective gains
then arise in terms of achieving public water policy objectives — a challenging
objective to achieve (Rausser et al. 2011). Sensible and conscientious governance
are necessary to make these opportunities work for individual users and society
alike (OECD 2015). If only private benefits are derived from the instrument, this
would not provide opportunities to improve public water outcomes. Rather, the
latter can be worsened, as may be evidenced by the erosion of environmental flows
in response to the introduction of early water market incentives in Australia
3The distinctive characteristics of water can make water quality management through economic
instruments a “wicked challenge” (Horan and Shortle, 2017). For instance, imperfect substitution
between different types of ‘bads’ (point vs. nonpoint pollution) in emission trading demands the use
of uncertainty ratios that are difficult to, and often inappropriately, framed.
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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(Connor and Kaczan 2013; Delacámara et al. 2015a). Conversely, where only
collective gains exist, this may offer positive water (re)allocation opportunities,
but an application of economic incentives may not be the most appropriate
instrument.
Welfare enhancing opportunities to combine private and collective benefits do
exist, and are particularly important for river basins where water is already scarce
and further supply development opportunities have been exhausted. Most of these
opportunities are the by-product of those same government failures (and successes)
that explain current water challenges: decades of supply-oriented measures that
have resulted in inefficient water (re)allocation. Opportunities for private and
collective benefits can accordingly be classified into four categories, based on the
current inefficiencies resulting from past decisions and practice: (i) allocative
efficiency gains from transferring water from low to high value uses, places and
times; (ii) technical efficiency for water abstraction, treatment, delivery and ap-
plication in given places and activities; (iii) coordination improvements between
relevant water policy domains (e.g., agriculture, energy, land planning, etc.) or
between users within the same river basin (upstream-downstream); and
(iv) rebalancing current water-uses toward conservation of natural ecosystems to
achieve welfare gains from a better preserved environment. The following
paragraphs discuss these welfare enhancing opportunities in detail.
Allocative inefficiency in water management is the natural outcome of institu-
tional constraints that preclude the (re)allocation of water to more valuable uses,
and encourage water-use with low marginal values and high opportunity costs.
For example, when property rights cannot be exchanged through voluntary
agreements4 or markets, agents often face a ‘use it or lose it’ trade-off dilemma. In
extreme cases, not using the water right may lead to its cancellation. Evidence of
gaps in the value of water across uses, places and times is a powerful argument to
expose the potential of transfers to enhance the allocative efficiency of water
through mutually-beneficial agreements among water-users. However, caution
should be exercised when developing opportunities for resource reallocation
among private users. Evidence shows that efficiency-focused approaches which do
not explicitly and actively pursue collective gains often lead to water overuse,
the depletion and pollution of water bodies, inequitable utilization of the resource
4In European countries like Italy, early drought is often managed through voluntary agreements
among users, who are given the chance to decide where and how much water withdrawals will be
reduced. Although the instrument is reported to be more efficient in mitigating welfare losses as
compared to command-and-control approaches, its effectiveness is limited when droughts aggravate
(Santato et al. 2016).
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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and degraded riverine and related ecosystems under reduced return-flows (see
e.g., Delacámara et al. 2015a).
Multiple welfare-enhancing opportunities are linked to bridging the technical
efficiency gap, which refers to water-uses across different purposes and, in par-
ticular, potential water savings from using the best available technologies.
However, once an efficiency gap has been identified, it is also important to un-
derstand why water-users do not choose to bridge this gap privately, and thus
whether water policy based on supporting (subsidizing) efficiency improvements
may be the best approach for correcting under-adoption. Failure to privately adopt
efficiency improvements can be partially explained by typically-adopted public
incentives such as low tariffs, subsidies, use it or lose it property rights, open-
access arrangements, and/or poor enforcement programs. A risk with technological
efficiency improvements may be, paradoxically, an increase in total water con-
sumption. This may stem from a failure to align governance and efficiency out-
comes (Gómez and Pérez-Blanco 2014), or where third-party impacts/benefits such
as return-flows and drainage are incorrectly specified (Adamson and Loch 2014).
Welfare-expansion can also come from coordination improvements in water
decisions at: the nexus between sectors such as food, water, energy and climate
change; places within the same catchment (upstream and downstream) or moments
of time (dry and rain season); and/or the (re)distribution of cooperation benefits to
enforce water-sharing or management agreements. This may be achieved through
the application of more appropriate forms of polycentric governance coordination
across and within policy-making parties (Garrick et al. 2012).
Finally, an increasing set of welfare-expansion opportunities are linked to
rebalancing water-use towards ecosystems in order to reap the benefits of better-
preserved water resources, and improvements in water quality (e.g., recreational
amenities, health benefits and urban regeneration — but also enhanced productive
processes). Integrated water resource management is based on the presumption
that these benefits outweigh opportunity costs; assuming restoration takes a cost
effective route (EC 2000). Functions traditionally performed by natural systems
such as filtration, storage or runoff regulation may offer more cost-effective, no-
regrets approaches to the management of pollution, controlling weather extremes
and reduced exposure to risk when compared against conventional grey (i.e.,
concrete) infrastructure (WWAP - UNESCO 2012). Despite a substantial body of
research indicating potential benefits (Mazza et al. 2011; Naumann et al. 2011), a
lack of long-term data and consistency in monitoring and valuation have largely
prevented the widespread adoption of these solutions in decision-making pro-
cesses, inhibiting wider uptake by risk-averse decision-makers and investors.
To address this problem, several countries are now in the process of releasing
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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strategies to foster an increased implementation of nature-based solutions
(EC 2013).
Thus, in general terms, appropriate water policy involving economic instru-
ments does not simply involve the engagement of individuals to reap private and
public benefits. Rather, it provides opportunities for private individual actions to
contribute to public river basin policy objectives. However, for these incentives to
work, policy-makers must clearly identify their objectives, be able to predict in-
dividual responses, and be aware of the hydrological limitations of the river basin.
This constrained-welfare framework allows for both the institutional goals to be
realized at least-cost, and the maximizing of returns from private uses whilst
preventing water-use that exceeds system capacity — consistent with the Hicks,
Kaldor and Pigou welfare question we originally raised. Next, we discuss practical
methods to maximize beneficial river basin policy outcomes from economic
instruments.
4. Making Incentives Work for Managing River Basins
Institutional inertia may lead to the perception that no new policy instruments are
required to harness the potential of opportunities for better river basin manage-
ment. However, welfare-improving opportunities will exist, and their potential
gains are not difficult to measure. Yet, achieving policy/management/collective
objectives comprise a necessary condition that will be determined by the incentives
and institutions put in place. A working hypothesis is that converting technical,
coordination, environmental and allocative efficiency opportunities into effective
contributions to river basin management goals requires sensible and conscientious
governance to catalyze cooperation among the groups of interest. The delivery and
implementation of purposely-designed economic instruments that align users’
actions with collective goals and increased social welfare is also required, other-
wise these opportunities will be lost. The following sections thus explore how to
achieve this goal for select economic instruments.
4.1. Pricing and charges
In other areas of the economy, the cost of acquiring a good is determined by the
interaction between supply and demand in a market environment, which leads to
an equilibrium price that reflects (at least) the cost of producing a marginal unit.
The uniqueness of water and the manifold market failures that stem from its
management can make this mechanism infeasible, and often undesirable.
Water prices represent a levy on use (i.e., a charge), which typically serves to
recover (part or all of) the costs associated with the infrastructure necessary to
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
1750004-12
W
at
er
 E
co
ns
. P
ol
ic
y 
20
18
.0
4.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 T
H
E 
U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
A
D
EL
A
ID
E 
on
 0
1/
18
/1
8.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
convey the resource to users (construction, operation, maintenance and future
refurbishment allowances). The full resource cost of water (i.e., the difference
between the value of realized use and that of the next best-relinquished water-use)
and environmental costs (aquatic ecosystem deterioration and depletion caused by
a particular water-use) is rarely recovered. Although insufficient evidence on the
biophysical processes linking the environmental status of water bodies to eco-
systems health complicate the definition of accurate environmental charges (Fin-
layson and Cruz 2005), major challenges stem from barriers to political
acceptability (EEA 2013). Moreover, charges are often decoupled from water-use
(e.g., payment per hectare of irrigated crops), spatial and temporal variations in
water availability are rarely accounted for, and pricing for different users can be
disparate (i.e., related to ability to pay disregarding use characteristics, as shown by
the gap in urban and agricultural water-use cost-recovery levels). These features
undermine incentives for use rationing, and may contribute to overexploitation
(EEA & OECD 2013; OECD 2014).
Yet, where the critical institutional transition and static transaction costs dis-
cussed above are fully accounted for, charges can represent a powerful instrument
to balance private benefits with collective objectives (Dinar and Subramanian
1997; Tsur and Dinar 1997). Given a demand function characterized by productive
users’ willingness to pay for a marginal unit of water, institutions can adjust
charges to determine the amount of extraction and resulting environmental flows at
any (site-specific) location and moment in time (permanent and incremental
charges).5 Higher charges strengthen the participation constraint, and contribute to
water policy objectives through reduced use or higher cost-recovery — provided
revenues are earmarked for water conservation-related policies (Kampas et al.
2012; Pérez-Blanco et al. 2016). When river basins are closed, charging resource
costs to water-users can also result in a more efficient market allocation, penalizing
those that are less productive and allowing for the entrance of more productive
users (Berrittella et al. 2007). Again, sensible and conscientious governance is
necessary here in order to prevent the realization of private welfare-enhancing
opportunities that lead to additional pressure on scarce water resources.
There is also a significant body of literature questioning the ability of water
charges to limit extraction in some water-scarce and drought-prone settings, where
the value of water is higher and demand is inelastic (recent examples can be found
in Berbel and Mateos 2014; Pérez-Blanco et al. 2015). In highly water-scarce
contexts, marginal willingness to pay (e.g., by agriculture) is increased, and higher
5In drought-prone and water contexts with inelastic agricultural water demand, balancing supply and
demand, through incremental charges may require high charges that are politically unfeasible.
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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charges can lead to significant income losses in water-intensive economic sectors
(e.g., irrigation), while doing little to improve environmental outcomes. Some
authors have claimed that charges are useless for achieving sustainability under
these conditions (Berbel and Mateos 2014). Yet, pricing can enhance positive
welfare outcomes when water demand response is inelastic. For example, in non-
allocative-efficient closed river basins where unrealized water-uses that can out-
perform existing applications are ignored, and status quo water-uses persist due to
low levels of cost-recovery and water charges, charges can be leveraged against the
high willingness of users to pay increased cost-recovery ratios. This will raise
revenue to fund activities that both enhance participation and contribute to the
achievement of collective goals (e.g., payment for ecosystem services). Alterna-
tively, if water demand is elastic and higher charges lead to a reduction of water
extractions and private income, revenue-raising can be used to compensate the
losses of individuals supplying valuable ancillary benefits (e.g., landscape man-
agement, cultural values). Affordability is thus addressed through separate mea-
sures decoupled from water-use, such as lump-sum subsidies or payment for
ecosystem services, instead of the reduction of water price incentives (EEA 2013).
EU water and agricultural policy are inspired by this approach: water policy
encourages (although does not enforce) full cost-recovery charging (EC 2000),
while the recently reformed Common Agricultural Policy relies mostly on direct
payments, of which 30% have to be ‘green payments’ related to ecosystem services
(OJ 2013).
4.2. Technical efficiency improvements
Taking advantage of opportunities to enhance the technical efficiency of water
extraction, storage, transportation, distribution and application has predominantly
been done by relying on existing instruments and institutions. Most policies aimed
at saving water via updated or new techniques focus public effort on overcoming
the participation constraint; typically by subsidizing the shift to better technology,
and taking the incentive compatibility for granted. That is, priority is given to
deliver upgrades while the importance of incentives for contributing to river basin
management objectives are overlooked, if not ignored entirely. However, failure to
properly incorporate incentive compatibility into technically-efficient economic
instruments will ultimately see those instruments themselves fail.
Higher technical-efficiency and welfare gains may not equate to water savings
or resource gains for a river basin. An increasing body of research shows how
unmanaged incentives can make water saving measures fail; particularly in the
irrigation sector where modernization plans are often publicized as ‘water
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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panaceas’. Analytical models show that final water extraction and consumption
following technical improvements are a function of three factors, namely:
(i) higher technical efficiency; (ii) application costs which typically increase with
more modern devices; and (iii) higher productivity per unit of water (Gómez and
Pérez-Blanco 2014). While the first two factors reduce extraction and consump-
tion, higher productivity of water creates new welfare opportunities that private
users can exploit at the expense of third-parties and the environment (including
double-cropping, more water intensive crops, or expansion of irrigated acreage). If
the latter outcome prevails, irrigation modernization may lead to higher con-
sumption, lower return-flows and aquifer replenishment, and reduced water
availability for other uses downstream — although water-use may actually fall (the
so-called hydrological paradox). Hydrological paradox outcomes have been
reported in several regions worldwide, including areas of the US (Pfeiffer and Lin
2014; Ward and Pulido-Velazquez 2008), Europe (Rodríguez-Díaz et al. 2012) and
India (Msangi and Cline 2016). In other cases, the productivity effect may be
overwhelming and lead to behavioral changes that increase both water consump-
tion and total extraction, as reported by Loch and Adamson (2015) for Australia.
The hypothesis that, under certain conditions, an increase in technical efficiency
may lead to an increase in the overall use of a resource is well known in eco-
nomics, and has received different names such as the Khazzoom-Brookes Effect or
the Jevons’ Paradox (Alcott 2008, 2005; Khazzoom 1989).
Even in those cases where paradoxes are not observed, incentive compatibility
may not be achieved. This can be evidenced in the case of subsidized technical
improvements that stabilize demand, but fail to reduce consumption. For instance,
Berbel et al. (2014) assess the outcomes of a heavily-subsidized irrigation mod-
ernization program in southern Spain and report a decrease in water extraction
together with a negligible increase in consumption. However, since consumptive
use is not reduced, any water saving exists only on paper. The ‘exceedance’ water
resources allocated to the environment are simply the return-flows and aquifer
percolation that resulted from earlier inefficient irrigation devices, now reallocated.
From our perspective, incentive compatibility can only be justified where the
benefits from the reallocation policy or projects outweigh the costs. This can be
achieved through qualitative improvements (e.g., a decrease in nitrate loads that
improve water quality), the restoration of valuable services (e.g., critical ecosystem
services supplied by reallocated irrigation water), and reclaiming non-recoverable
runoff/percolation. One such example can be found in the investments conducted
in the San Joaquin River in California to minimize drainage water from irrigation,
and thus reduce high selenium, boron and salt loads (Linneman et al. 2014).
However, in most cases, these collective benefits are typically not measured
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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and there is little evidence on the actual contribution of technical efficiency
improvements.
Additionally, under specific conditions, subsidized technical improvements can
actually strengthen the participation constraint. For example, more efficient irri-
gation networks increase the need for complementary inputs such as energy for
sprinklers and irrigation control, and labor (Corominas 2010; Rodríguez-Díaz et al.
2012). Higher irrigation costs may erode individual incentives to engage in irri-
gation and save water, in particular when water prices are relatively low compared
with competitive labor and energy prices. Barriers to participation may be also
triggered if no public subsidies are in place and full-cost recovery is applied. Since
the technical shift involves a change in the incentives, users are unlikely to con-
tinue making the same decisions as before. Assuming that water savings are di-
rectly proportional to the improvement in the technical efficiency is misleading,
and can make (often heavily) subsidized technical improvements backfire. Previ-
ous research reports that higher (or similar) water extraction and consumption
levels following technical efficiency improvements are more likely to happen when
irrigated land can be expanded, the water constraint is binding (fallow land, deficit
irrigation), the know-how to introduce water intensive crops is in place, and the
efficiency of previous infrastructure is significantly lower. On the other hand,
reducing water rights or constraining irrigated land when water accounting is
insufficiently developed, removing harmful subsidies (e.g., energy subsidies that
reduce application costs) and increasing the price of water can potentially mitigate
water demand increases triggered by higher water productivity (Berbel et al. 2014).
Integrating technical efficiency improvements into river basin management
objectives thus requires careful consideration of how the welfare of individuals
interacts throughout the hydrological system, and matching the use of comple-
mentary economic instruments with the capacity to transform potential savings into
contributions to reduce water scarcity, drought risk or meet any other policy ob-
jective. Overall, without complementary instruments, an increase in irrigation ef-
ficiency makes water a more productive input and may result in an increase in,
rather than a reduction of, water extraction and consumption.
4.3. Cooperative agreements
Cooperative agreements are incentive-based voluntary arrangements negotiated
among parties for the adoption of practices that contribute to water policy objec-
tives (Lago et al. 2015). The economic incentive can be of a pecuniary (typically
through a subsidy) or non-pecuniary nature (community recognition of private
efforts). The former are known as Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) and are
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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frequently used to make farmers adopt practices that are expected to enhance the
quantitative and/or qualitative status of water bodies. The latter include Voluntary
Agreements (VA) based on non-pecuniary economic incentives that make use of
existing welfare enhancing opportunities to align individual decisions with col-
lective goals.6 Economic incentives exclude voluntary arrangements that are the
direct consequence of a regulation; for example, Drought Steering Committees in
Europe (see e.g., JRBA 2005; PRBA 2003).
PES involve a bidirectional wealth transfer, in which water policy objectives
come at the expense of financial compensations paid to water-users (beneficiary-
pays principle). The accomplishment of PES is conditioned to the ability of
institutions to define payments consistent with the shadow price of water across
uses, time and space. In the case of water resources, principal-agent problems are
often characterized by relevant information constraints and asymmetries that can
lead to outcomes that are ineffective (low participation), costly (large information
rents), or both (Iftekhar et al. 2013; Zuo et al. 2015). The latter was the case of the
Special Plan of the Upper Guadiana in Spain, which targeted the restoration of
upstream Guadiana River aquifers through an investment of EUR 5.5 billion
(of which EUR 3 billion was ultimately approved) to reduce pumping by
200 hm3/year. Limited water accounting capacity led institutions to buy back water
rights worth EUR 66 million through the purchase of agricultural land, resulting in
the acquisition of 2 hm3 of actual water and a larger volume of paper rights (13.3–
13.6 hm3Þ (Fernández-Lop and Hernández Herrero 2013).
When shadow-price estimates can be more accurately obtained, PES can be an
effective coordination tool to restore ecosystem services. PES have the ability to
overcome resistance from users and unblock transition (Crase et al. 2013; Marshall
2013), offering an edge on solutions based on the polluter-pays principle (PPP)
(e.g., charges). Yet, better coordination and improved ecosystem services through
PES come at the expense of a (significant) burden on the public budget. In the
Murray-Darling Basin in Australia, the presence of water markets notably reduced
information constraints, yet the expenditure on water buyback programs still to-
taled AU$2.3 billion to acquire 1500 gigaliters over a five-year period (DoEE
2016). Another constraint for the implementation of PES is legal in nature. In some
legal settings (e.g., in the EU), the beneficiary-pays principle has been adjudicated
6In this definition, we include negotiated agreements among government authorities and/or private
parties to achieve environmental objectives through the use of incentives that are “truly voluntary”
and go “beyond compliance to regulated obligations” (i.e., rewards or penalties) (Lago et al. 2015).
Examples can be found in the collective action Spanish and Italian watershed boards implement to
reduce allocation during droughts (García-Mollá et al. 2013; Santato et al. 2016).
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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against, arguably making PPP closer to a principle than a rule (Lindhout et al. 2014).
Although this has not prevented low cost-recovery ratios or the implementation of
buyback schemes in Europe, the apparent mismatch between legal principles and
realpolitik is being addressed by significant European research initiatives to improve
the understanding of biophysical processes, value ecosystem services, and accurately
charge uses that modify these outcomes (see e.g., Notte et al. 2012).
Contexts in which a successful VA may be accommodated can be difficult to
find. The competitive nature of markets makes it challenging to find unexploited
opportunities for individual profit, especially if these opportunities also need to
generate collective gains. Room for VAs can be found in the literature on nature-
based solutions, which portray an ample range of green technologies with low
uptake that can help improve the environmental status of water bodies, while
outperforming available engineering technologies (Baro et al. 2015; Gómez et al.
2014). Due to persistent uncertainty not only on the actual performance of the
technology (lack of long-term data and consistency in monitoring), but also on
institutional and legal frameworks, mainstream adoption of nature-based solutions
has proved challenging. In this context, VAs between public and private enterprises
can help reduce information constraints and uncertainty, and lead to successful
partnerships that enhance private benefits while creating collective gains. National
and supranational strategies for the implementation of green infrastructures and
other nature-based solutions will play a relevant role in this regard, paving the role
for higher legal and institutional certainty and the development of successful VAs
among private and public enterprises (EC 2013).
4.4. Water trading
Water trade is by far the most complex and challenging of economic instruments
to design, implement and sustain over time. However, water trading is an effective
way for fully-aware buyers and sellers to reallocate water through voluntary and
mutually-beneficial agreements. This increases and/or ensures the production of
goods and services, and makes water exchange a convenient instrument to pro-
mote different economic activities (Young 2010). Theoretically, a perfectly-
functioning market free from government interference allows for the efficient
(re)allocation of resources, leading to optimal outcomes. In this “efficient equilibrium
state, the resource costs, opportunity costs and social costs are equal at the margin,
and they are all equal to the price of water” (Randall 1981: p. 197). Such optimal
economic development objectives, rather than water management goals, were
the main driver in the original adoption of many current water trading schemes
(Howe 2000).
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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Apart from the interest of potential buyers and sellers, the real opportunity of
water trading lie on its potential to obtain benefits for water policy objectives.
Thus, as a means to an end, water trading should not be judged simply by its
financial performance (be it volume of water traded or prices), but also according
to its effective contribution to curb scarcity, reduce drought-exposure, meet water
quality standards and increase economic resilience and/or adaptability (Quiggin
2012). In other words, from a river basin perspective, the key to designing and
implementing a water trade scheme arises from transforming good business
opportunities for those directly involved in the bargain, into good water gover-
nance outcomes for everyone. Therefore, when designing economic instruments,
policy-makers should understand the behavioral responses to these instruments so
that water-users don’t over-invest in systems that prevent their ability to trade and
expose capital to undue risk (Adamson and Loch 2014).
Trade can contribute to water policy objectives by improving water allocation
among market activities that enhance the potential of the economy to increase the
provision of goods and services within the range of existing water resources, given
water quality requirements. This is the case for water markets in Australia, Chile
and western USA, although some literature suggests the effect is more limited in
the latter two cases (Garrick et al. 2009; Grafton et al. 2011). Water trade can also
improve water-user adaptability by making water allocation contingent to available
resources in order to reduce welfare losses and provide a better response to
droughts (Crase and Gawne 2011; Loch et al. 2012). An example of this is,
replacing water licenses with shares that allow holders to use a proportion (instead
of a fixed amount) of allotments in Australian water markets (Young 2014).
Markets can further reallocate water-user risks, so that the vulnerability of water-
uses exposed to scarcity and droughts is diminished, as was evident in Australia
during the Millennium drought where perennial crops were kept alive by forgoing
annual crop opportunities (Loch and Adamson 2015). Conveying incentives for
water conservation and pollution abatement through the more immediate aware-
ness of water’s value on a market is a significant benefit from trade arrangements;
even though evidence shows that, if not complemented with sensible governance,
the actual outcome of markets can be the opposite (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop
1975; Quiggin 2001). This may be offset by providing an alternative to traditional
approaches to water management that discourages costly and potentially regret-
table investments (Kates et al. 2012; Mazza et al. 2011), for instance through
unbundled property rights systems that fully assign the investment risk to share-
holders (Young 2015). Finally, markets make clear to water-users, interest groups
and institutions the opportunity costs (i.e., those associated to foregone alternative
choices) of some of their decisions (Delacámara et al. 2015b). This is a primary
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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objective for water banks, which institutionalize water trading through an
intermediary administrative agency acting between buyers and sellers (see e.g.,
Montilla-López et al. (2016) for a review of international experiences with
water banks).
Assuming zero-transaction costs, opportunities to reallocate water to its most
productive uses exist when the value of water is variable across water-users. This is
the approach generally followed to identify the potential of water markets (Rey
et al. 2011). However, transaction costs matter (as we have shown above), cannot
generally be assumed away at zero-levels, and affect how much water can be
transferred within and between river basins. This is especially true when we take
into account all environmental constraints and possible costs (i.e., opportunity
costs, costs from transport and interim losses due to infiltration and evaporation,
and transaction costs including institutional and neoclassical or market exchange/
transfer costs). Evidence shows that, even under the spurious assumption of zero-
transaction costs, opportunities for water trade decay in relation to the number of
water bodies involved and delivery distances as transport costs increase (Delacá-
mara et al. 2015a). Further, from a social perspective, a key question is whether the
best interests of market-contracting parties also represent the best interests of all
other parties potentially affected by the spatial (re)allocation of water in response to
new policy objectives. This implies taking into account all opportunity costs,
including any third-party and indirect socio-economic effects associated with
former water-uses. For example, if unaccounted for, technical efficiency gaps be-
tween users can increase consumption and reduce environmental flows — the case
of the interconnected Tagus and Segura basins in Spain (Rey et al. 2016). Major
transactions like this can also affect commercial income beyond the agricultural
sector (e.g., food processing industries) through substantial, uncompensated
economy-wide impacts. Accounting for water consumption, instead of diversions,
could address the problem — although it would likely increase transaction costs
and reduce gains from trade (Connor and Kaczan 2013). Further, operationalizing
water markets requires significant payments to transform the allocation regime,
that may strain public budgets (Garrick and Aylward 2012).
Restoring incentive compatibility to allow water trade to achieve collective
objectives requires accounting for externalities and third-party effects at the river
basin scale; else deep and competitive markets may become a driving force of
water scarcity, instead of an instrument for water conservation. Too much attention
has been focused on defining property rights for efficient trade, and far less on
identifying the transactions that may be environmentally-neutral once all side-
effects have been taken into account. In water-stressed areas, the scope for trade
shrinks notably when, beside private gains, incentive compatibility constraints are
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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brought into the picture; for instance through in-kind taxes on trade to keep water
consumption at similar, or even lower, levels, in order to enhance environmental
flows (Gómez et al. 2013). The effect of making these caveats over water costs will
be higher the larger the technical efficiency gap, since the interests of more groups
can be affected leading to larger opportunity and transaction costs (Rey et al.
2011). General reviews of experience to date with water trade suggests that these
effects have not been taken into account (Hanak et al. 2011; Young 2010). Rather,
they are often overlooked along with environmental impacts in particular. Fur-
thermore, although limits to water rights are legally defined, managers do not enjoy
complete understanding of possible contingencies or comprehension of the mul-
tiple ways that water-use and diversion decisions might affect the choice portfolio
of third-parties, and/or the environmental services potentially delivered by water to
ecosystems along an entire river basin (Howe 2000).
If collective action through cooperation among relevant interest groups is put in
place to complement individual incentives, water trade can be highly instrumental
in aligning individual actions with multiple relevant collective objectives for water
resource management; especially in water-scarce and drought-prone river basins.
The main implementation challenge, apart from the considerable institutional
capacity and investments needed to establish an sustain markets, concerns adapting
the typically pervasive business opportunities that may stem from the ability to
trade water with the more intricate (and potentially less politically-defensible)
policy objectives of water conservation, drought risk reduction, quality improve-
ments, etc.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Imbalances between water supply and demand are costly not only for the envi-
ronment but also for private users. For instance, an average of EUR 6.2 billion of
market income has been lost yearly to water shortages in the EU since 1980, and
this figure does not account for indirect impacts or persistent losses to structural
scarcity (Strosser et al. 2012). A better (re)allocation and management of water
resources can mitigate the impact of droughts and scarcity on production, and also
contribute to achieving public policy goals. However, strategies to tackle water
insecurity have largely failed to create meaningful incentives that align private
interests and collective goals — the basic foundation needed to enforce the mea-
sures and recommendations that good water policy puts forward.
The conceptual framework presented in this paper has been used to assess the
role of economic instruments in contributing to private (participation) and public
policy (incentive compatibility) goals, and the development of alternatives to
Managing Water Scarcity at a River Basin Scale with Economic Instruments
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reshape them so that they enhance their performance in the context of water
scarcity and drought management. A key lesson to be drawn from our analysis is
that economic instruments are context-specific, and their contribution is condi-
tioned to the objectives they were designed to address — be it a better environ-
mental status, (allocative) efficiency, affordability, no-regrets outcomes (meaning
that the instrument is reversible and/or useful even if does not address the intended
impacts), fairness (based on compliance with the PPP), or a combination of all of
these. Sensible sequencing and thoughtful use of synergies at a micro-, meso- and
macro-economic level is a prerequisite to the development of a policy mix that
fully exploits available welfare-enhancing opportunities. For example, the com-
bination of water markets and pricing/charges can increase economic surplus,
enhance users’ ability to pay through gains from trade, and incentivize lower
water-use through higher costs; potentially while complying with the PPP. On the
other hand, the implementation of markets may demand substantial investments in
physical infrastructure and institutional transaction costs, and thus be challenging
to revert in cases where design failures arise, and higher costs displace low-income
farmers leading to inequitable outcomes. The realization and amplitude of these
outcomes are context specific in time, space and institutional setup terms.
Economic instruments build on significant advances in social science research,
which make it increasingly feasible to address persistent problems of a social,
political, economic and institutional nature. Bridging the gap between our under-
standing of hydrological and socioeconomic processes offers the opportunity for
better communication between all of these parties. However, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, the intricate implementation of economic instruments may have moved
attention away from the problems they are designed to solve, and instead placed it
squarely upon the instruments themselves. As we have shown here, full-fledged
economic instruments rooted exclusively on the first welfare theorem of economics
are insufficient to resolve water management problems which largely stem from the
coordination and institutional challenges of managing the multiple uses of a
complex asset like water.
Yet, where we substitute conventional notions of command-and-control and
centralized planning for economic instruments with implicit incentives, motivation
and multi-level governance arrangements, we may facilitate the development of
management solutions that also contribute to water policy objectives. This paper
identifies the welfare-enhancing opportunities possible in water resource man-
agement through the adoption of various economic instruments, and assesses how
to leverage them to improve allocative efficiency while balancing private and
collective income. We argue that from an integrated water resources management
perspective, economic instruments are but a means to an end and must be judged
C. M. Gómez Gómez et al.
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based on their ultimate contribution to private and public policy goals. Any
analysis must go beyond the boundaries of simple balances between costs and
benefits to instead rely on bounded-rationality frameworks that make the best
possible use of the existing information. However, we also advocate applying
precautionary principles to carefully examine alternative courses of action, so as to
discard those posing a higher probability of resulting in negative outcomes. Thus,
rather than favoring one instrument over another, we warn against the historical
failure of seeking water panaceas that promote the use of a single instrument
in isolation.
Economic instruments are not only creatures of design but also of context. Their
role cannot be understood in isolation, but rather as an integral part of the policy
mix and the institutional and socioeconomic background in which they take place.
Conversely, the performance of other (economic) instruments within the policy
mix is also conditioned by existing arrangements, calling for a careful assessment
of spill-over effects not limited to water policy and users, but including synergies
across related policies and economic sectors. Much research is still needed to
understand the dynamics of the so-called nexus; putting in place economic
instruments based not only on competition but also on cooperation is but a
prerequisite to fully exploit their welfare-enhancing potential.
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